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SOME PROBLEMS IN CO:MMUNICATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHER AND 
SCIENTIST (An Asymptotic Approach to Truth*) 
by 
K. Thomas Finley 
I fully agree that neither the practice of science nor the philosophy of scien.ce 
have benefited appreciably from attempts to stimulate mutual interaction. The 
chief reason for this less-than-optimum utilization of our limited intellectual 
resources may lie in our frequent inability to communicate clearly across dis­
ciplinary boundaries. Our use of language seems to be precise and meaningful 
when we deal with other members of our own peer group, but scientists and 
philosophers often seem to lose this effective use of language when dealing with 
each other. 
It is my purpose in these brief notes to present a few of Professor Martin's 
key points in terms of the images they create in my mind. This step is essential, 
not simply to provide additional examples and illustrations of his ideas, but to 
test whether or not we are communicating appropriately. If we are, fine; let's go 
on to explore the solid theoretical and practical assistance philosophers and 
scientists can offer one another. If we are not communicating appropriately, at 
least we have some crudely charted territory in which to search for language on 
which we may come to agree. 
Before turning to these key points, I should like to deal briefly with one 
minor point: the use of the term "science education" as it sometimes is under­
stood at a teacher's college which recently has become a liberal arts college. At 
such institutions, "science education" often has a very specialized meaning in 
that it relates chiefly to the methods and the content of science teaching as 
these may be appropriate to science education in public schoo�s. I am confident, 
after reading Professor Martin's paper, that he does not intend to be limited to 
such a definition of "science education"; nor do I. Perhaps the phrase "educa­
tion in science" could be adopted instead. I believe such terminology includes 
everything from a single semester of general science to a Ph. D. program in a 
particular science and might be more appropriate for· our discussions. 
Scientist qua Scientist 
Professor Martin frequently uses "scientist qua scientist" in discussing prob­
lems of value judgments and the acceptance of hypotheses in science. The 
terminology appears to me to present no difficulty for the scientist: I take it to 
mean simply a view of the scientist acting as if he were only a scientist. But I am 
not sure we all appreciate certain implications of the phrase "scientist qua 
scientist", and in this we may be failing to communicate appropriately. I take 
it as axiomatic that no human being can ever act only in terms of one facet of 
his being; nor can a person ever be appropriately described as possessing only one 
such facet. It follows, therefore, that the scientist qua scientist does not exist. 
*1 shall use the word truth in the sense of an ideal measurement or exact (correct) ex· 
planation of a physical observation. Thus, we may have stated the truth, but in principle we 
can never be sure that we have. 
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Let me be quick to point out that I am not dismissing the use of the concept 
of the scientist qua scientist. In fact, the world of the scientist abounds with the 
use of quite analogous concepts. Examples would include the concept of the 
frictionless piston and tlhe ideal gas law. Machines that do not lose energy and 
gas particles that do not occupy space or interact with one another are clearly 
not real systems by any stretch of the imagination; yet valuable theoretical and 
practical results flow from the consideration and application of such apparently 
naive approximations. Thus, I am willing to grant that the concept of scientist 
qua scientist may be an important tool for the investigation of the philosophy of 
science and especially the ground of mutual concern to the philosopher­
educator and scientist-educator. The utility of this concept in this latter area 
remains to be demonstrated (as does most of this field, as witness the paucity 
of recorded studies). No scientist would continue to use the concept of the 
frictionless piston or the ideal gas law if these concepts did not lead to significant 
results, and we must ask as much of the concept "scientist qua scientist". 
Acceptance of Hypotheses 
The emphasis given by Professor Martin to the matter of hypothesis accep­
tance by scientists seems to me to be a particularly central and appealing point 
of departure. If we (scientist and philosopher) can communicate on a matter so 
basic to tlhe growth of science, the future for further cooperation is indeed 
bright. Thus, I am all the more concerned that interested philosophers be sure 
of one scientist's understanding of Professor Martin's position. 
I believe it will be helpful to view acceptance on a continuous scale. An 
appropriate analogy might be a scale of percent composition of water-alcohol 









100% or pure water would correspond to the ·truth. On such a linear scale the 
hypothesis situated farthest to the right at any time is designated acceptanceB. 
We can now rephrase Professor Martin's description of acceptanceB as the hypo­
thesis that most adequately explains the currently available experimental evi­
dence. AcceptanceB may change with time or it may be the truth. History shows 
that the former condition is much more probable and, in principle, we cannot be 
sure of the latter. 
Various degrees of sophistication can be ascertained in acceptanceu. These 
approximations would be arranged in order of increasing descriptive and predic-
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tive power (Figure 2). It is important to keep in mind, as 
acceptanceu 1 acceptanceu 2 acceptanceB truth 
Figure 2 
Professor Martin quite rightly points out, that either form of acceptance (and 
any submodifications) can be useful in a particular context. Thus I prefer to 
think of the series: 
acceptanceu 1, acceptanceu2 . . .  acceptanceun = acceptanceB --.truth limit 
as simply an arsenal of tools available for solving a certain class of problems. One 
important aspect of my job as a scientist is to select the appropriate degree of 
hypothesis acceptance for the problem. I believe this approach has the added 
advantage of showing clearly the interrelationships of hypotheses concerning a 
specific scientific problem. 
To illustrate, suppose we are concerned with the pressure-volume-tempera­
ture behavior of a certain gas. Over some range of conditions, the ideal gas law 
(equation 1) may prove to be in agreement 
p - RT v (Eq. 1) 
with the behavior of the gas under experimental conditions. But no one serious­
ly believes that the ideal gas law can.ever be more than a crude approximation of 
reality, however useful it may be. As a scientist, in this situation the ideal gas law 
is a hypothesis that I acceptu1. It .is important to note that all of the variables in equation 1 can be shown, on both theoretical and experimental grounds, to 
govern the behavior of gases. The pressure (P), the volume (V), and the tempera­
ture (T) of the gas are measurable and related to one another as required by the 
equation. The term R is a constant of proportionality for one mole of the gas. 
If I require more precise agreement with a broader range of experimental 
conditions, I might employ the Van der Waals hypothesis (equation 2). This 
new hypothesis, in taking into account the size 
p = RT V-b 
(Eq. 2} 
of molecules and the interactions among molecules, provides a better approxi­
mation of the properties of the gas under study. Thus, I acceptu the Van der 
Waals hypqthesis. The relationship between the ideal gas law anj the Van der 
Waals equation is obvious for the comparable variables (P, V, and T). The 
constants "a" and "b" illustrate an additional subtlety in the acceptance of 
scientific hypotheses. These parameters can be related in theory to certain ex-
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perimental. realities ("a" to the interactions of the gas particles and "b" to their 
excluded volume). However, the optimum values for a given gas must be det�r­
mined experimentally. We find an example of better experimental (practical) 
agreement at the expense of complete theoretical understanding. 
The series of acceptanceu can be extended to still higher levels of agreement 
with experiment. For exam�e, the Beattie-Bridgeman hypothesis (equation 3) 
retains the theory based idea gas law variables 
P = RT(l-*3) 
v2 
V + B (1 - .b..) 0 v 
(Eq. 3) 
and the less rigorously derived Van der Waals constants, but adds three more 
arbitrary constants (A0, B�» and c) that must be obtained experimentally and 
are much less perfectly understood in theory. 
Thus, we approach the correct or true understanding of natural phenomena as 
a limit and we accept imperfection or at least uncertainty of perfection. At any 
point in time some hypothesis will be the best approximation we have of the 
truth and will receive acceptanceB at that time. It is essential to recognize that 
any of these hypotheses, regardless of the state of their acceptance, can be the 
most appropriate tool in a given situation. 
In conclusion, let me point out that Professor Martin's example of the two 
acceptance senses (acceptanceB and acceptanceu) shows that he is dealing with 
a single hypothesis and variable experimental facts. I have attempted to empha­
size the frequently observed situation in science where several hypotheses might 
be applied to the explanation of a single set of experimental observations. Both 
aspects of rthe problem need to be treated, and I see no fundamental difference 
in our explanations. In fact, I am very optimistic about the future benefit of 
action of tlhe science-philosophy interface. 
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